Krise im Kaukasus „Russia's New Assertiveness“

Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, der für Außenpolitik zuständige Redakteur der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, hat kürzlich vor dem Deutsch-Indischen Beratungskreis in München über Auswirkungen strategischer Veränderungen auf Deutschland gesprochen. Er nahm hauptsächlich zu dem Geschehen im Kaukasus und zum Vorgehen Russlands Stellung. Wir dokumentieren die gekürzte Fassung des in englischer Sprach gehaltenen Vortrags.

Russia's New Assertiveness

August 8, 2008, has already been called a turning point in modern history. It was the day, authoritarianism stood up as a credible force for the first time since the end of the cold war. In Beijing a self-confident China made a powerful entry into the Champions League of World politics applauded to by world leaders who did not fail to stand up when the Chinese team marched into the Olympic stadium. It was, as the Chinese authorities may have planned this extravaganza of technology, sports, and culture, the welcome of a new aspiring world class power. Thousands of miles to the East, in the Caucasus, that very same day Russian tanks were filing day into Georgian territory. It was the display of traditional power in its most-old fashioned form. Russia made its imprint unlike China not as a power geared to the future, but one that re-enacts its Soviet, if not Czarist grandeur and an imperial nostalgia in its near abroad. The consequences of both will be with us for a long time.

I will not dwell on China. Suffice to say that the rise of China epitomized in the August Olympics and that of India are of fundamental importance for the world, for big power relationships and the world economy. One dispute with China is about its system of governance, the pace of political change, and the willingness to observe human rights or the lack thereof. In Germany, there is a constituency which asks to be outspoken on Chinese human rights abuses and China's treatment of its minorities. It may enter into a coalition, like in the United States, with those who see themselves as losers of globalization. The metaphor of China being the world's assembly line is actually mobilizing resentment that, combined with human rights concerns, creates a potentially influential political force. At times, the human rights side of it has a champion in the chancellery. But then, the Dalai Lama is invited to it only so often.

Back to Russia. Russia's new assertiveness bears heavily on Europe. It creates policy conflicts and major dilemmas which we are now confronted with. It challenges our assumptions as Strobe Talbott, the former Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration, grudgingly and disappointedly suggested the other day in the “Washington Post“ - one assumption being Russia's interest in being integrated in the institutions of European and global governance both political and economic.

Indeed, no matter who has started the military conflict in the Caucasus - this is no trivial question -, what was cause and what was trigger, events that unrolled on August 8 have changed the geopolitical parameters in and around Europe. There may be a dynamic unforeseen and the long-term fall out be difficult to anticipate. There may also be unexpected consequences. For example this one: the re-glueing together of the member states of the EU.

There are several reasons why Russia reacted so vigorously and disproportionately.

- We may see an attempt to reconsolidate the post-Soviet space and re-establish regional control and dominance thwarting American attempts of some geopolitical competition. This comes after the reconsolidation of power and centralizing authority within Russia.

- A second motive may be energy-related. Moscow is highly suspicious of Western projects to diversify energy supplier and transport networks and at least not to increase European dependence on Russia. Russia wants fully control of all the Caspian and Central Asian energy exports to the West and of the pipeline network - for commercial, strategic, and political purposes. That is why control over the Caucasus, given its geo-strategic and geo-economic importance, is a vital interest for at least one faction in the Russian power elite.

- The third motive is political. The ruling elite in Moscow see experiments in democracy at its periphery as a direct political-ideological challenge. These forms must be eliminated. Georgian President Saakaschwili has certainly a lot of flaws, and the Georgian political system has certainly a lot of flaws, too. But it nevertheless is on the way to a full-fledged democracy - unlike Russia.

- Given the language he uses Prime Minister Putin seems to take it almost personal that Russian leaders have opted to join the Institutions of the Atlantic community. This is a traditional reflex. Strategically, it is the culmination of a behaviour pattern that started with the Orange revolution in the Ukraine, continued over Kosovo and reached decision point with the NATO Bukarest summit in April. I am convinced that in the aftermath of Nato's decision to deny Georgia and the Ukraine the MAP status, but to accept them as members eventually, Moscow decided to act forcefully. So a trap was set for Georgia. And the Georgian leaders were foolish or desperate enough to go for the bait.

What are the consequences? What kind of policy-decisions Western, European, and German leaders should take vis-à-vis this newly assertive, if not neo-imperial Russia suffering from empire-nostalgia syndrome?

For NATO the lessons are clear and not clear at the same time. Clearly NATO enlargement meets Russia's ferocious resistance. If Georgia is taught a Russian lesson because of its interest in joining the Atlantic Alliance - a lesson which includes the unilateral recognition of two break-away regions, I,. e. Georgian territory -, what can we expect when it comes to the Ukraine? Would NATO be prepared to extend security guarantees to the Ukraine? I think not. But acknowledging this reluctance cannot mean that the West is recognizing this large European country as Russia's “chasse gardée“. When governments and publics aspire “to go West“, we cannot make this subject to Moscow's approval. Not in principle and not in practice.

Russia's tactics have sobered minds in Europe. I do not challenge the wisdom of engagement as such, nor do I disagree in principle with those who call for greater interconnectedness. But the dispute over the merits and possibilities of having a strategic partnership with Russia is as unresolved as ever. Sure, we receive a third of our oil and more than of third of the gas we consume from Russia. And the trade volume is growing reapidly; Russia is a fast growing export market for German manufacturers. So any talk of applying sanctions is countered by our self-interest and the dependence on this energy supplier.But then, we cannot pretend that this is a time of business as usual. And: Russia is not only a partner, it is also competitor, rival, and opponent. Because it is all of that and because values, policies, and interests are not identical, a strategic partnership is something for the future. If the world was pretty much opposed to the US. Invasion of Iraq, we need to make it clear to Russia that big power politics and heavy-handed sphere of influence tactics come with a price. And this price may be in Russia's economic and commercial interests in Germany. It is not as invulnerable as its leaders make the Russian people believe - and by the way the long-term prospects as far less impressive as its Petrodollar fuelled strength suggests. They are actually frightening. Because without modernization, development, de-bureaucratization and the introduction of competition as a social and political modus operandi Russia's strength may be a temporary phenomenon. Tanks are not the commodity of the future.

Given the tensions that any further NATO enlargement in the future is bound to create, it will fall on the European Union to become more visible at its Eastern perimeter. It is imperative to do so. This does not mean to hand out membership promises now, but it must think and act strategically when it comes to the Ukraine and to the Caucasus. A much closer cooperation with these countries is possible and necessary. We can selectively create forms of association that do not overburden the institutions of the EU - nor the public readiness to accept new members -, but create powerful incentives for and within the new partner countries. The EU's recent summit with the Ukraine was too timid in this direction. It is particularly Germany that needs to be a more courageous.

Eventually, the negotiations over a new partnership agreement with Russia will commence. It is a partnership we want. But we have to be clear what it entails what it does not entail. It cannot ignore attempts of a neo-Soviet style consolidation of the space that stretches from Moldova to the Kazahstan. It is a partnership that is clear about its foundations and that calls on Russia to unequivocally accept the EU. On our part, we should stop to publicly make us weaker and more impotent that we are. If Russia really wants to modernize, and modernize it must, its partner is Europe.

One and a half year ago, then President Putin delivered a blistering attack against the U.S. It prompted a German commentator to make a reference to the Cold War. Are we about to enter into a new Cold War? Has it already begun? I do not think so. But then, some of the trappings of that period are visible, if only for symbolic and domestic purposes. Here is the danger: We have seen Cold War imagery in the run up to the March election in Russia, we have witnessed a language reminiscent of a period we had thought relegated to the dustbin of history. Talk of the town in Moscow is about pay back, perceived humiliation, the dissolution of the Soviet Union being the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, the need to stop an allegedly aggressive NATO in its tracks. We see a tit-for-tat mechanism at work, with Russia, for example, announcing maritime exercises in the Caribean in response to NATO ships in the Black Sea. There may be a danger that this may get out of hand, when inflammatory rhetoric and stereotyping perceptions fuel real actions and vice versa.

We all share an interest and a responsibility that it does not come to this. We prefer engagement over isolation and confrontation. But then, it takes two to tango. Russia's rulers may have already recognized that Russia has to loose a lot, too - economical, commercially, in acceptability and reputation - more so than they previously thought. In any case: We can somewhat influence the political dynamic in Russia, as we have also a number of carrots that can be withheld. But ultimately it is Russia that will decide the outcome of the struggle between nationalists and those willing to engage in relationships of greater interdependence.