Afghanistan-Strategie des Westens Die Geduld nicht verlieren

Will 2009 be the year which will ultimately decide the fate of the West's engagement in Afghanistan? In a recent speech to the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Foreign Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, looked at the challenges ahead of the presidential elections.

Don't Lose Patience

The conflict in Afghanistan and political unrest in neighbouring Pakistan pose more than a mere challenge to the international community. They are threatening international security and undermine efforts to bring about regional stability.

Given the deployment of Western troops in Afghanistan, alliance solidarity and coherences are affected as is the support among Western publics for what their governments are doing in Southwest Asia.

A multidimensional conflict

At a time when there is a news swell of a growing insurgency and spread of Taliban militancy, Western publics' patience diminishes reflecting talk by officials about the wisdom of the whole engagement, about exiting and soul-searching what a defeat in Afghanistan would mean for Nato, for example.

In other words: This conflict is multidimensional, and Western forces and governments fight at more than one front. It is with this sense of urgency and drift that the new U.S. administration has reviewed its strategy, refocused and reprioritized somewhat and trying to clarify the goals and objectives it and its partners wish to achieve.

President Obama's new strategy is a combination of old and new, of increased hard power, broadened soft power, and a wider focus. He has made a major commitment, which is not only necessary, but should be shared by his European and other Western partners.

Three elements of strategy

There are three elements in his strategy. Each of which has a lot in its favour, but poses questions and problems of its own.

The surge in military forces to be deployed in the most volatile regions of Afghanistan is imperative as development and political stabilization depend on increased security. There is no alternative to confronting and defeating the radical Taliban and the Al Qaida operatives on both sides of the border.

It is imperative to deprive them of the platform and safe heavens from which they launch their tactical and strategic terrorist attacks and destabilize the region. For too long, Nato was short of combat forces and other critical assets in areas where insurgents are rampart. So it is of the essence to address this deficit. The surge of more than 20.000 troops may be doing just that.

Impartial burden-sharing

But it may also put in even sharper relief the imbalance of burdens shared and risks incurred among Nato allies and non-Nato partners. This issue simply will not go away, especially when the going gets even rougher. The re-americanization of the hard-nosed, combat side of the Afghanistan operation may a sign of political realism or of disappointed hopes on the part of the U.S.

It nevertheless presents Nato with a severe problem oft its own as the discrepancies within the alliance in terms of military capabilities and political will become ever more obvious. It simply spells trouble for alliance coherence, solidarity and burden-sharing. And it has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

If the U.S. carries most of the heavy military burden and most of the risk, why then involve others in military decision- and strategy-making, when involving should mean more than just providing legitimacy. We may end where we started with former President Bush: the coalition of the willing-type of intervention.

Growing scepticism

It is a good sign that some allies have agreed to send more troops for the August election. But it may not be enough. I know that it is easier said than done to call for even greater commitments - and for strategic patience.

Most of the allies with troops deployed in Afghanistan face growing scepticism, if not resistance among their respective electorates. Take Germany as an example: In a recent poll, Germans were asked if Bundeswehr troops should stay in Afghanistan or withdraw as soon as possible. 32 percent of the respondents said German troops should stay in the country, a decline of ten percentage points, while no less than 64 percent opted for withdrawal, an increase of nine percentage points.

So two thirds of those polled do seem to believe that Germany's engagement was not worthwhile, that Germany was not pursuing the right strategy or Germany's vital interests were not seriously affected. This is as bleak a picture as it can get clearly explaining the caution displayed by German policy-makers and politicians when it comes to demands to increase the number of German troops or redeploy those who are already in the country.

No military solution alone

On the other hand, political leadership is about doing the unpleasant and explaining what is believed to be necessary. So there is much room for improving political communication to make a long-term commitment politically accepted at home.

It has been the mantra of almost everybody involved in the Afghanistan operation, that this conflict will not be solved by military means alone. Germany has called for some time to adopt a comprehensive strategy. Rightly so, true enough. But aside from the fact that without security there is no development, the reality on the ground and the record are mixed at best.

Experts say the have never seen such a chaos when it come comes to coordinating international assistance both public and private. A plethora of governmental and nongovernmental organizations is involved, each of which pursuing its own project. This leads to duplication and a waste of energy and resources.

Europe's soft power might fail

Afghanistan may need more aid, it definitely needs more and better coordination. Hopefully, the recent initiatives will make a difference. Japan and Europe may find here possibilities for collaboration and joint action. As far as the Europeans are concerned, it would be a sad irony if they underperformed or failed in an area they call their strength: in the domain of soft power.

Some European countries certainly cannot be satisfied with what they have achieved in areas they have been given responsibility.

This conflict will not be solved, unless the authority of the Afghan government is strengthened both in scope and in depth. State-capacity building is of utmost importance as it seems also the only clear path to the exit. All government activities need to be scrutinized for the effect they have on the various part of the country or the lack thereof. The corruption issue needs to be addressed as should the narcotics business, and the role of government figures, war lords, and radical insurgents.

Puppet of outside forces?

With reference to the upcoming presidential election I only wish to mention the following: People may be unhappy with President Karzai, rightly or wrongly. But I wonder how the Afghans will respond when U.S. policy-makers delegitimize him by overtly advocating one of his potential opponents, after the previous administration was very close to him. This only serves to feed into the perception that whoever is ruling in Kabul is a puppet of outside forces.

The issue of increased and sustained developments efforts ties in with the third element in President Obama's strategy: the regional approach and the focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan's Eastern neighbour. It is high time that Pakistan gets the uncompromised international attention it deserves: as a hotbed for radicalization, an exporter of militant Islam, a nuclear-weapons state, and as a frontline state in the fight against terrorism.

It has been said for some time now that the situation in Afghanistan will not improve unless the deteriorating situation in Pakistan is dealt with, for the latter spills over into the former. We certainly can all agree with what had been said by Prime Minister Aso at the donor conference the other week here in Tokyo: Insuring stability in Pakistan is a key in the fight against terrorism. “Without stability in Pakistan, there is no stability in Afghanistan, either.“

Ways to stop Talibanization

And it may be a little presumptuous, close to blackmail, when Pakistan President Zardari said at the same occasion: “If we lose, you lose. If we lose, the world loses.“ But then, he is not far off the mark, either. So in principle and in general it is very welcome that Japan, the European Union and the United States, among others, have pledged economic assistance to Pakistan to help this country against the forces of extremism and Islamist fanaticism.

But apart from giving economic assistance, what more can we do to stop the slide into the Talibanization of more and more territory? Probably it would help a great deal when the Pakistani leadership pursued a clear, persistent course and not cave into demands by the radicals all too often.

It is an effort of huge proportion when U.S. special envoy Holbrooke, echoing Mess. Aso and Zardari, says Pakistan needs to be fixed, because otherwise efforts to stabilize Afghanistan will not succeed. Well, fixing Pakistan, one of the most volatile and dangerous countries that come to mind, is a tall order in nation-building, a generational project, maybe is as grandiose as bringing democracy to the Middle East by military means. Are we prepared for this long-haul exercise?

Anti-American settlement on the rise

Many questions need to be answered. It seems logical to relate progress in Afghanistan to stability in Pakistan, as there is enough empirical evidence to track instability East of the border to unrest West of it. On the other hand, it makes progress in Afghanistan a hostage to progress in stabilizing Pakistan and securing its safe havens from which militants, extremists, and terrorist operate.

Complicating efforts is the indisputable fact that pro-Taliban, anti-American sentiment in Pakistan is on the rise. Complicating efforts even more is the historical record of the relationship between elements in the Pakistani security apparatus and the Taliban. To what extent does this relationship still exist?

If it exists in a meaningful way, no wonder that our efforts get sabotaged, that the Taliban are on the rise, that defeat is an unfortunate possibility. So the question is how to make Pakistan, i.e. the civilian and military leadership, persistently agree to the goals of those nations which are engaged in Afghanistan and make the much needed commitment in the struggle against the forces of radicalization. What can we do to make this possible without fanning the flames of radicalization ourselves is a challenge that needs to be addressed without delay.

A greater sense of realism

Let me conclude by saying that we need more clarity about the goals we wish to achieve, the strategies we employ toward that end, the instruments we use. Is democracy the ultimate goal, or is it improving state-capacity? Is it simply to not allow Afghanistan to become once more the staging area for transnational terrorism? Or is the one inherently related to the other?

We need a greater sense of realism, about the goals and limits that we face, but also a clear understanding of what is at stake: for us, the region, the world. We must be honest to ourselves and not shy away from acknowledging that this is a conflict that has all the trappings of a war. It may very well call for a generational engagement that demand all the political skill our governments can muster.

One question that may need to be answered fairly soon pertains to the possibility of breaking the ranks of the Taliban. Can so called moderate Taliban wooed away from the hard-core militants and extremists. What do we mean when we speak of “moderate Taliban“?

Moderate Taliban?

I do not want to sound cynical but sometimes I have the feeling that a moderate Taliban is someone who pours acid on the face of a school-girl to deter her and others from going to school and sabotage Western development efforts while a radical Taliban uses bombs and other explosives.

Can there be held serious negotiations with Taliban who are convinced that their military victory is in sight and they only need to wait until we loose interest and stamina? Experts like Ashley Tellis from the Carnegie Foundation call this the worst possible approach to stabilize Afghanistan. Earlier U.S. signals of impatience and a desire for exit would motivate insurgents to maintain a hard-line and outlast the international coalition.

We should not waver in our commitment to the region because it is in our best interest to help stabilize it. Any instability will spill over with potentially disastrous consequences all over the place.